



## **Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis**

Project:

Rosemount 8800D Vortex Flowmeter

Company:

Emerson

Eden Prairie, MN

USA

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## Management Summary

This report summarizes the results of the hardware assessment in the form of a Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA) of the Rosemount 8800D Vortex Flowmeter, hardware and software revision per Section 2.5.1. A Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis is one of the steps to be taken to achieve functional safety certification per IEC 61508 of a device. From the FMEDA, failure rates are determined. The FMEDA that is described in this report concerns only the hardware of the 8800D. For full functional safety certification purposes, all requirements of IEC 61508 must be considered.

The Rosemount 8800D Vortex Flowmeter is a smart device providing flow measurement of gases, liquids, and steam. It features a non-clogging sensor and an all-welded body that requires no process seals and protects against fugitive emissions. The 8800D is available with HART or Foundation Fieldbus communication protocol and an optional pulse output. This FMEDA applies to the 8800D HART SIS Vortex Flowmeter with “SI” option code. The 4-20 mA output is the safety variable, but the pulse output may also be used for non-safety purpose.

Table 1 gives an overview of the different versions that were considered in the FMEDA of the 8800D. The MTA feature is excluded from this analysis and assessment scope.

**Table 1 Version Overview**

High Trip	Safety function trips on excessive flow reported
Low Trip	Safety function trips on insufficient flow reported

The 8800D is classified as a Type B<sup>1</sup> element according to IEC 61508, having a hardware fault tolerance of 0.

The failure rate data used for this analysis meet the *exida* criteria for Route 2<sub>H</sub> (see Section 5.2) (and the diagnostic coverage resulting from the analysis exceeds the required 60% threshold).

Therefore, the 8800D meets the requirements for architectural constraints of an element such that it can be used to implement a safety function with the following constraints:

- SIL 2 @ HFT=0, SIL 3 @ HFT=1, Route 1<sub>H</sub> where the SFF ≥ 90%
- SIL 2 @ HFT=0, SIL 3 @ HFT=1, Route 2<sub>H</sub>, Low Demand applications only
- SIL 2 @ HFT=1, SIL 3 @ HFT=1, Route 2<sub>H</sub>, High Demand application

Based on the assumptions listed in 4.3, the failure rates for the 8800D are listed in section 4.4.

These failure rates are valid for the useful lifetime of the product, see **Error! Reference source not found.**

The failure rates listed in this report are based on over 400 billion-unit operating hours of process industry field failure data. The failure rate predictions reflect realistic failures and include site specific failures due to random human events for Site Safety Index (SSI) [N10], [N11].

A user of the 8800D can utilize these failure rates in a probabilistic model of a safety instrumented function (SIF) to determine suitability in part for safety instrumented system (SIS) usage in a particular safety integrity level (SIL).

<sup>1</sup> Type B element: “Complex” element (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2, ed2, 2010.



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## 1 Purpose and Scope

This document shall describe the results of the hardware assessment in the form of the Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis carried out on the 8800D. From this, failure rates for each failure mode/category, useful life, and proof test coverage are determined.

The information in this report can be used to evaluate whether an element meets the average Probability of Failure on Demand ( $PFD_{AVG}$ ) requirements and if applicable, the architectural constraints / minimum hardware fault tolerance requirements per IEC 61508 / IEC 61511.

A FMEDA is part of the effort needed to achieve full certification per IEC 61508 or other relevant functional safety standard.





[N8]	Meeting Architecture Constraints in SIF Design, Recorded Web Seminar, March 2013	<a href="http://www.exida.com/Webinars/Recordings/Meeting-Architecture-Constraints-in-SIF-Design">http://www.exida.com/Webinars/Recordings/Meeting-Architecture-Constraints-in-SIF-Design</a>
[N9]	Random versus Systematic – Issues and Solutions, September 2016	Goble, W.M., Bukowski, J.V., and Stewart, L.L., Random versus Systematic – Issues and Solutions, exida White Paper, PA: Sellersville, <a href="http://www.exida.com/resources/whitepapers">www.exida.com/resources/whitepapers</a> , September 2016.
[N10]	Assessing Safety Culture via the Site Safety Index™, April 2016	Bukowski, J.V. and Chastain-Knight, D., Assessing Safety Culture via the Site Safety Index™, Proceedings of the AIChE 12th Global Congress on Process Safety, GCPS2016, TX: Houston, April 2016.
[N11]	Quantifying the Impacts of Human Factors on Functional Safety, April 2016	Bukowski, J.V. and Stewart, L.L., Quantifying the Impacts of Human Factors on Functional Safety, Proceedings of the 12th Global Congress on Process Safety, AIChE 2016 Spring Meeting, NY: New York, April 2016.
[N12]	Criteria for the Application of IEC 61508:2010 Route 2H, December 2016	Criteria for the Application of IEC 61508:2010 Route 2H, exida White Paper, PA: Sellersville, <a href="http://www.exida.com">www.exida.com</a> , December 2016.
[N13]	Using a Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA) to Measure Diagnostic Coverage in Programmable Electronic Systems, November 1999	Goble, W.M. and Brombacher, A.C., Using a Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA) to Measure Diagnostic Coverage in Programmable Electronic Systems, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 66, No. 2, November 1999.
[N14]	FMEDA – Accurate Product Failure Metrics, June 2015	Grebe, J. and Goble W.M., FMEDA – Accurate Product Failure Metrics, <a href="http://www.exida.com">www.exida.com</a> , June 2015.

## 2.4 exida tools used

[T1]	V7.1.18	exida FMEDA Tool
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## 2.5 Reference documents

### 2.5.1 Documentation provided by Emerson

[D1]	Doc # 00813-0100-4004, Rev KG	Data Sheet
[D2]	Doc # 00809-0100-4004, Rev DA	Reference Manual
[D3]	Doc #08800-7606, Rev AF	Schematic Drawing, Terminal Board
[D4]	Doc # 08800-7609, Rev AA	Schematic Drawing, Display Board
[D5]	Doc # 08800-7703, Rev AN	Schematic Drawing, Output Board
[D6]	Doc #08800-7700, Rev AN	Schematic Drawing, Sensor Board



[D7]	Doc # 08800-7702-0009, Rev AD	Bill of Material, non-MTA
[D8]	Doc # 08800-7702-1009, Rev AD	Bill of Material, MTA
[D9]	E-mail rec'd. 2006-05-02	Diagnostics descriptions
[D10]	8800D_HART_Electronics_Block_Diagram.ppt	8800D Drawings
[D11]	8800D FIT results.zip	Fault Injection Test Results
[D12]	D082_8800_8600_SIL_Diagnostics.pptx	Updated Diagnostic Descriptions for 8800D/8600D, Oct 2023

### 2.5.2 Documentation generated by *exida*

[R1]	8800D LCD Board 2016-01-07.efm	Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis – 8800D Display Board
[R2]	8800D Output Board 2017-02-10 - mA.efm	Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis – 8800D Output Board, mA Safety Critical Output
[R3]	8800D Sensor Board 2017-08-10 - NoMTA.efm	Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis – 8800D Sensor Board, no MTA
[R4]	8800D Sensor Board 2017-08-10 – NoMTA – Low Trip.efm	Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis – 8800D Sensor Board, no MTA
[R5]	8800D Vortex Sensor 2017-08-07.xls	Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis – 8800D Sensor
[R6]	8800D Vortex Sensor 2017-08-10 Low Trip.xls	Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis – 8800D Sensor
[R7]	8800D Term Board 2016-01-20 - mA.efm	Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis – 8800D Terminal Board Board, mA Safety Critical Output
[R8]	8800D Summary 2017-08-10.xls	Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis - Summary –8800D

### 3 Product Description

The Rosemount 8800D Vortex Flowmeter is a smart device providing flow measurement of gases, liquids, and steam. It features a non-clogging sensor and an all-welded body that requires no process seals and protects against fugitive emissions. The 8800D is available with HART or Foundation Fieldbus communication protocol and an optional pulse output. The 8800D is available as a dual assembly which consists of two independent flowmeters designed into a single unit. For the purposes of this report, each dual flowmeter is considered to consist of two independent units. The 8800D is also available as a quad assembly which consists of four independent flowmeters, designed into a single unit. For the purposes of this report, each quad flowmeter is considered to consist of four independent units.

For safety instrumented systems usage it is assumed that the 4 – 20mA output is used as the primary safety variable. Other outputs are not covered by this report. The analog output may be configured to meet NAMUR NE 43 (3.8mA to 20.5mA usable). The system contains self-diagnostics and is programmed to send its output to a specified failure state upon internal detection of a failure.



**Figure 1 Typical 8800D, Parts included in the FMEDA**

Table 2 gives an overview of the different versions that were considered in the FMEDA of the 8800D. The MTA feature is excluded from this analysis and assessment scope.

**Table 2 Version Overview**

High Trip	Safety function trips on excessive flow reported
Low Trip	Safety function trips on insufficient flow reported

The 8800D is classified as a Type B<sup>2</sup> element according to IEC 61508, having a hardware fault tolerance of 0.

<sup>2</sup> Type B element: “Complex” element (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2, ed2, 2010.





## 4 Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis

The Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis was performed based on the documentation in section 2.5.1 and is documented in [R1] to [R8].

When the effect of a certain failure mode could not be analyzed theoretically, the failure modes were introduced on component level and the effects of these failure modes were examined on system level, see Fault Injection Test Report [D11].

### 4.1 Failure categories description

In order to judge the failure behavior of the 8800D, the following definitions for the failure of the device were considered.

Fail-Safe State	Failure that deviates the process signal or the actual output by more than 2% of span, drifts toward the user defined threshold (Trip Point) and that leaves the output within the active scale.
Fail Safe	Failure that causes the device to go to the defined fail-safe state without a demand from the process.
Fail Detected	Failure that causes the output signal to go to the predefined alarm state ( $\leq 3.75$ or $\geq 21.75$ mA, user selected).
Fail Dangerous	Failure that deviates the process signal or the actual output by more than 2% of span, drifts away from the user defined threshold (Trip Point) and that leaves the output within the active scale.
Fail Dangerous Undetected	Failure that is dangerous and that is not being diagnosed by automatic diagnostics.
Fail Dangerous Detected	Failure that is dangerous but is detected by automatic diagnostics.
Fail High	Failure that causes the output signal to go to the over-range or high alarm output current ( $\geq 21.75$ mA).
Fail Low	Failure that causes the output signal to go to the under-range or low alarm output current ( $\leq 3.75$ mA).
No Effect	Failure of a component that is part of the safety function but that has no effect on the safety function.
Annunciation Detected	Failure that does not directly impact safety but does impact the ability to detect a future fault (such as a fault in a diagnostic circuit) and that is detected by internal diagnostics. A Fail Annunciation Detected failure leads to a false diagnostic alarm.
Annunciation Undetected	Failure that does not directly impact safety but does impact the ability to detect a future fault (such as a fault in a diagnostic circuit) and that is not detected by internal diagnostics.

The failure categories listed above expand on the categories listed in IEC 61508 in order to provide a complete set of data needed for design optimization.

Depending on the application, a Fail High or a Fail Low failure can either be safe or dangerous and may be detected or undetected depending on the programming of the logic solver. Consequently, during a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) verification assessment the Fail High and Fail Low failure categories need to be classified as safe or dangerous, detected or undetected.



The Annunciation failures are provided for those who wish to do reliability modeling more detailed than required by IEC61508. It is assumed that the probability model will correctly account for the Annunciation failures.

## 4.2 Methodology – FMEDA, failure rates

### 4.2.1 FMEDA

A FMEDA (Failure Mode Effect and Diagnostic Analysis) is a failure rate prediction technique based on a study of design strength versus operational profile stress. It combines design FMEA techniques and parts stress analysis with extensions to identify automatic diagnostic techniques, the failure modes relevant to safety instrumented system design, and proof test coverage. It is a technique recommended to generate failure rates for each failure mode category [N13], [N14].

### 4.2.2 Failure rates

The accuracy of any FMEDA analysis depends upon the component reliability data as input to the process. Component data from consumer, transportation, military or telephone applications could generate failure rate data unsuitable for the process industries. The component data used by *exida* in this FMEDA is from the Electrical and Mechanical Component Reliability Handbooks [N3] which were derived using:

- Over 400 billion unit operational hours of process industry field failure data from multiple sources.
- Failure data formulas derived from IEC TR 62380, SN 29500 and industry sources.
- Manufacturer Meetings.
- Component Research.

The *exida* profile chosen for this FMEDA was 2 as this was judged to be the best fit for the product and application information submitted by Emerson.

Early life failures (infant mortality) are not included in the failure rate prediction as it is assumed that some level of commission testing is done. End of life failures are not included in the failure rate prediction as useful life is specified.

The failure rates are predicted for a Site Safety Index of SSI=2 [N10], [N11] as this level of operation is common in the process industries. Failure rate predictions for other SSI levels are included in the exSILentia® tool from *exida*.

The user of these numbers is responsible for determining the failure rate applicability to any particular environment. *exida* Environmental Profiles listing expected stress levels can be found in Appendix A. Some industrial plant sites have high levels of stress. Under those conditions the failure rate data is adjusted to a higher value to account for the specific conditions of the plant. *exida* has detailed models available to make customized failure rate predictions. Contact *exida* for assistance.

Accurate plant specific data may be used to check validity of this failure rate data. If a user has data collected from a good proof test reporting system such as *exida* SILStat™ that indicates higher failure rates, the higher numbers shall be used.



### 4.3 Assumptions

The following assumptions have been made during the Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis of the 8800D.

- The worst-case assumption of a series system is made. Therefore, only a single component failure will fail the entire 8800D.
- Failure rates are constant for the useful life period.
- Any product component that cannot influence the safety function (feedback immune) is excluded. All components that are part of the safety function including those needed for normal operation are included in the analysis.
- The stress levels are specified in the *exida* Profile used for the analysis are limited by the manufacturer's published ratings.
- Practical fault insertion tests have been used when applicable to demonstrate the correctness of the FMEDA results.
- The HART protocol is only used for setup, calibration, and diagnostics purposes, not for safety critical operation.
- The application program in the logic solver is constructed in such a way that Fail High and Fail Low failures are detected regardless of the effect, safe or dangerous, on the safety function.
- Materials are compatible with process conditions.
- The device is installed and operated per manufacturer's instructions.
- service has been considered in the analysis.
- External power supply failure rates are not included.
- Worst-case internal fault detection time is <1 hour.

### 4.4 Results

Using reliability data extracted from the *exida* Electrical and Mechanical Component Reliability Handbook the following failure rates resulted from the 8800D FMEDA.

Table 3 and Table 4 list the failure rates for the 8800D with a Site Safety Index (SSI) of 2 (good site maintenance practices). See Appendix C for an explanation of SSI and the failure rates for SSI of 4 (ideal maintenance practices).



**Table 3 Failure rates with Good Maintenance Assumptions in FIT @ SSI=2 (High Trip)**

Failure Category	Failure Rate (FIT)
Fail Safe Undetected	32
Fail Dangerous Detected	387
Fail Detected (detected by internal diagnostics)	228
Fail High (detected by logic solver)	92
Fail Low (detected by logic solver)	67
Fail Dangerous Undetected	119
No Effect	460
Annunciation Undetected	6

**Table 4 Failure rates with Good Maintenance Assumptions in FIT @ SSI=2 (Low Trip)**

Failure Category	Failure Rate (FIT)
Fail Safe Undetected	76
Fail Dangerous Detected	387
Fail Detected (detected by internal diagnostics)	228
Fail High (detected by logic solver)	92
Fail Low (detected by logic solver)	67
Fail Dangerous Undetected	74
No Effect	460
Annunciation Undetected	6

Table 5 lists the failure rates for the 8800D according to IEC 61508.

**Table 5 Failure rates with Good Maintenance Assumptions in FIT @ SSI=2 according to IEC 61508**

Application/Device/Configuration	$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}^3$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	#	DC
High Trip	0	32	387	119	466	76%
Low Trip	0	76	387	74	466	84%

Where:

$\lambda_{SD}$  = Fail Safe Detected

$\lambda_{SU}$  = Fail Safe Undetected

<sup>3</sup> It is important to realize that the No Effect failures are no longer included in the Safe Undetected failure category according to IEC 61508, ed2, 2010.



$\lambda_{DD}$  = Fail Dangerous Detected  
 $\lambda_{DU}$  = Fail Dangerous Undetected  
# = No Effect Failures

These failure rates are valid for the useful lifetime of the product, see section 4.6.

## 4.5 Proof Test Coverage

According to section 7.4.5.2 f) of IEC 61508-2 proof tests shall be undertaken to reveal dangerous faults which are undetected by automatic diagnostic tests. This means that it is necessary to specify how dangerous undetected faults which have been noted during the Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis can be detected during proof testing.

### 4.5.1 Suggested Proof Test

The suggested proof test for the 8800D is described below. Refer to Table 8 for the Proof Test Coverages

The suggested proof test consists of setting the output to the min and max, and a calibration check.

**Table 6 Suggested Proof Test – Basic**

Step	Action
1.	Bypass the safety function and take appropriate action to avoid a false trip.
2.	Inspect flow meter for any leaks, visible damage or contamination.
3.	Verify that the transmitter does not indicate alarms or warnings using HART host or LCD.
4.	Cycle power.
5.	Use HART communications to retrieve any diagnostics and take appropriate action
6.	Disable Write Protection.
7.	Send a HART command to the transmitter to go to the high alarm current output and verify that the analog current reaches that value.
8.	Send a HART command to the transmitter to go to the low alarm current output and verify that the analog current reaches that value. Exit fixed current mode.
9.	For process flow greater than Low Flow Cutoff: Confirm measured flow compares reasonably to an independent measurement. For process flow less than Low Flow Cutoff: Check output at 2 points using internal flow simulation, with at least one point between LFC and URV.
10.	Verify safety critical configuration parameters (ref K factor, pipe ID, fixed process temp, fixed process density, LRV, URV, LFC, damping)
11.	Enable write protection.
12.	Remove the bypass and otherwise restore normal operation.



**Table 7 Suggested Proof Test – Comprehensive**

Step	Action
1.	Bypass the safety function and take appropriate action to avoid a false trip.
2.	Inspect flow meter for any leaks, visible damage or contamination.
3.	Verify that the transmitter does not indicate alarms or warnings using HART host or LCD.
4.	Cycle power.
5.	Use HART communications to retrieve any diagnostics and take appropriate action.
6.	Disable Write Protection.
7.	Send a HART command to the transmitter to go to the high alarm current output and verify that the analog current reaches that value.
8.	Send a HART command to the transmitter to go to the low alarm current output and verify that the analog current reaches that value. Exit fixed current mode.
9.	Perform a 3 to 5 point calibration check of the transmitter and flow meter against a reference standard.
10.	Verify safety critical configuration parameters (ref K factor, pipe ID, fixed process temp, fixed process density, LRV, URV, LFC, damping)
11.	Enable write protection.
12.	Remove the bypass and otherwise restore normal operation.

#### 4.5.2 Proof Test Coverage

The Proof Test Coverage for the various product configurations is given in **Error! Reference source not found..**

**Table 8 Proof Test Coverage – 8800D**

Device	$\lambda_{DuPT}$ (FIT)	Proof Test Coverage
High Trip - Basic	18	85%
High Trip - Comprehensive	7	94%
Low Trip - Basic	17	77%
Low Trip - Comprehensive	6	92%

#### 4.6 Useful Life

The Useful Life of the device predicted by component failure data is approximately 500,000 hours.



## 4.7 Architecture Constraints

According to IEC 61508-2 the architectural constraints of an element must be determined. This can be done by following the  $1_H$  approach according to 7.4.4.2 of IEC 61508-2 or the  $2_H$  approach according to 7.4.4.3 of IEC 61508-2, or the approach according to IEC 61511:2016 which is based on  $2_H$  (see Section 5.2).

The  $1_H$  approach involves calculating the Safe Failure Fraction for the entire element.

The  $2_H$  approach involves assessment of the reliability data for the entire element according to 7.4.4.3.3 of IEC 61508-2.

The failure rate data used for this analysis meets the *exida* criteria for Route  $2_H$  (which is more stringent than IEC 61508-2) (and the diagnostic coverage resulting from the analysis exceeds the required 60% threshold).

Therefore, the 8800D meets the requirements for architectural constraints of an element such that it can be used to implement a safety function with the following constraints:

- SIL 2 @ HFT=0, SIL 3 @ HFT=1, Route  $1_H$  where the SFF  $\geq$  90%
- SIL 2 @ HFT=0, SIL 3 @ HFT=1, Route  $2_H$ , Low Demand applications only
- SIL 2 @ HFT=1, SIL 3 @ HFT=1, Route  $2_H$ , High Demand application

The architectural constraint type for the 8800D is B. The hardware fault tolerance of the device is 0. The SIS designer is responsible for meeting other requirements of applicable standards for any given SIL.

Table 11 lists the failure rates for the 8800D according to IEC 61508 with a Site Safety Index (SSI) of 4 (perfect site maintenance practices). This data should not be used for SIL verification and is provided only for comparison with other analysis that has assumed perfect maintenance. See Appendix C for an explanation of SSI.



## 5 Using the FMEDA Results

The following section(s) describe how to apply the results of the FMEDA.

### 5.1 PFD<sub>avg</sub> calculation 8800D

Using the failure rate data displayed in section 4.4, and the failure rate data for the associated element devices, an average the Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD<sub>avg</sub>) calculation can be performed for the element.

Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD<sub>avg</sub>) calculation uses several parameters, many of which are determined by the particular application and the operational policies of each site. Some parameters are product specific and the responsibility of the manufacturer. Those manufacturer specific parameters are given in this third-party report.

Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD<sub>avg</sub>) calculation is the responsibility of the owner/operator of a process and is often delegated to the SIF designer. Product manufacturers can only provide a PFD<sub>avg</sub> by making many assumptions about the application and operational policies of a site. Therefore, use of these numbers requires complete knowledge of the assumptions and a match with the actual application and site.

Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD<sub>avg</sub>) calculation is best accomplished with *exida's* exSILentia tool. See Appendix B for a complete description of how to determine the Safety Integrity Level for an element. The mission time used for the calculation depends on the PFD<sub>avg</sub> target and the useful life of the product. The failure rates and the proof test coverage for the element are required to perform the PFD<sub>avg</sub> calculation. The proof test coverages for the suggested proof tests are listed in section 4.5.

### 5.2 *exida* Route 2<sub>H</sub> Criteria

IEC 61508, ed2, 2010 describes the Route 2<sub>H</sub> alternative to Route 1<sub>H</sub> architectural constraints. The standard states:

"based on data collected in accordance with published standards (e.g., IEC 60300-3-2: or ISO 14224); and, be evaluated according to

- the amount of field feedback; and
- the exercise of **expert judgment**; and when needed
- the undertake of specific tests,

in order to estimate the average and the uncertainty level (e.g., the 90% confidence interval or the probability distribution) of each reliability parameter (e.g., failure rate) used in the calculations."

*exida* has interpreted this to mean not just a simple 90% confidence level in the uncertainty analysis, but a high confidence level in the entire data collection process. As IEC 61508, ed2, 2010 does not give detailed criteria for Route 2<sub>H</sub>, *exida* has established the following:

1. field unit operational hours of 10,000,000 per each component or known common usage of the component for over ten years in at least 10 units; and
2. operational hours are counted only when the data collection process has been audited for correctness and completeness; and
3. failure definitions are realistic without data censoring of failures with both a systematic and random failure cause [N9]; and
4. every component used in an FMEDA meets the above criteria.





This set of requirements is chosen to assure high integrity failure data suitable for safety integrity verification [N12].

## 6 Terms and Definitions

Automatic Diagnostics	Tests automatically performed online internally by the device or, if specified, externally by another device without manual intervention or manual interpretation of the results.
DC	Diagnostic Coverage
<i>exida</i> 2H criteria	A conservative method for arriving at failure rates suitable for use in hardware evaluations utilizing the 2 <sub>H</sub> Route with more detail and more requirements than specified in IEC 61508-2.
Fault tolerance	Ability of a functional unit to continue to perform a required function in the presence of faults or errors (IEC 61508-4, 3.6.3).
FIT	Failure in Time ( $1 \times 10^{-9}$ failures per hour)
FMEDA	Failure Mode Effect and Diagnostic Analysis
HFT	Hardware Fault Tolerance
$PFD_{avg}$	Average Probability of Failure on Demand
SFF	Safe Failure Fraction, summarizes the fraction of failures which lead to a safe state plus the fraction of failures which will be detected by automatic diagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action.
SIF	Safety Instrumented Function
SIL	Safety Integrity Level
SIS	Safety Instrumented System – Implementation of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of sensor(s), logic solver(s), and final element(s).
Type A element	“Non-Complex” element (using discrete components); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2
Type B element	“Complex” element (using complex components such as micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2



## 7 Status of the Document

### 7.1 Liability

*exida* prepares FMEDA reports based on methods advocated in engineering literature and International technical reports. Failure rates are obtained from field failure studies and other sources. *exida* accepts no liability whatsoever for the use of these numbers or for the correctness of the standards on which the general calculation methods are based.

Due to future potential changes in the standards, product design changes, best available information and best practices, the current FMEDA results presented in this report may not be fully consistent with results that would be presented for the identical model number product at some future time.

Most products also tend to undergo incremental changes over time. If an *exida* FMEDA has not been updated within the last three years, contact the product vendor to verify the current validity of the results.

### 7.2 Version History

Contract Number	Report Number	Revision Notes
Q23/04-121	ROS 06/03-34 R001 V4 R0	Surveillance Audit, Updated template, 2023-11-17 VAM
Q20/01-099	ROS 06/03-34 R001 V3 R7	Updated per customer comments, 2020-09-25
Q20/01-099	ROS 06/03-34 R001 V3 R6	Updated per latest template, 2020-04-15
Q16/12-042	ROS 06/03-34 R001 V3 R5	updated company name, updated FIT results filename; 2017-10-6, JCY
Q16/12-042	ROS 06/03-34 R001 V3 R4	Updated Figure 1 per client, 2017-09-08
Q16/12-042	ROS 06/03-34 R001 V3 R3	Updated per client feedback, 2017-09-06
Q16/12-042	ROS 06/03-34 R001 V3 R2	Separated high and low trip, added multiple proof tests, 2017-08-10
Q16/12-042	ROS 06/03-34 R001 V3 R1	Changed to Route 2 <sub>H</sub> , updated failure rates, deleted pulse output and MTA, 2017-07-14
Q15/10-011	ROS 06/03-34 R001 V2 R1	Added pulse output; updated per client updates; January 22, 2016
Q06/03-34	ROS 06/03-34 R001 V1 R2	Added clarification for dual flowmeter assemblies, July 20, 2006
Q06/03-34	ROS 06/03-34 R001 V1 R1	Updated per RA review, released; May 31, 2006
Q06/03-34	ROS 06/03-34 R001 V0 R2	Updated proof test per JCG comments; May 31, 2006
Q06/03-34	ROS 06/03-34 R001 V0 R1	Draft; May 26, 2006

Reviewer: Molly O'Brien, *exida*, 11/28/23

Status: Released, 11/28/23

### 7.3 Future enhancements

At request of client.

### 7.4 Release signatures



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## Appendix A *exida* Environmental Profiles

Table 9 *exida* Environmental Profiles

<i>exida</i> Profile	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>Description (Electrical)</b>	Cabinet mounted/ Climate Controlled	Low Power Field Mounted no self-heating	General Field Mounted self-heating	Subsea	Offshore	N/A
<b>Description (Mechanical)</b>	Cabinet mounted/ Climate Controlled	General Field Mounted	General Field Mounted	Subsea	Offshore	Process Wetted
<b>IEC 60654-1 Profile</b>	B2	C3 also applicable for D1	C3 also applicable for D1	N/A	C3 also applicable for D1	N/A
<b>Average Ambient Temperature</b>	30 C	25 C	25 C	5 C	25 C	25 C
<b>Average Internal Temperature</b>	60 C	30 C	45 C	10 C	45 C	Process Fluid Temp.
<b>Daily Temperature Excursion (pk-pk)</b>	5 C	25 C	25 C	2 C	25 C	N/A
<b>Seasonal Temperature Excursion (winter average vs. summer average)</b>	5 C	40 C	40 C	2 C	40 C	N/A
<b>Exposed to Elements / Weather Conditions</b>	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Humidity<sup>4</sup></b>	0-95% Non-Condensing	0-100% Condensing	0-100% Condensing	0-100% Condensing	0-100% Condensing	N/A
<b>Shock<sup>5</sup></b>	10 g	15 g	15 g	15 g	15 g	N/A
<b>Vibration<sup>6</sup></b>	2 g	3 g	3 g	3 g	3 g	N/A
<b>Chemical Corrosion<sup>7</sup></b>	G2	G3	G3	G3	G3	Compatible Material
<b>Surge<sup>8</sup></b>						
Line-Line	0.5 kV	0.5 kV	0.5 kV	0.5 kV	0.5 kV	N/A
Line-Ground	1 kV	1 kV	1 kV	1 kV	1 kV	
<b>EMI Susceptibility<sup>9</sup></b>						
80 MHz to 1.4 GHz	10 V/m	10 V/m	10 V/m	10 V/m	10 V/m	N/A
1.4 GHz to 2.0 GHz	3 V/m	3 V/m	3 V/m	3 V/m	3 V/m	
2.0GHz to 2.7 GHz	1 V/m	1 V/m	1 V/m	1 V/m	1 V/m	
<b>ESD (Air)<sup>10</sup></b>	6 kV	6 kV	6 kV	6 kV	6 kV	N/A

<sup>4</sup> Humidity rating per IEC 60068-2-3

<sup>5</sup> Shock rating per IEC 60068-2-27

<sup>6</sup> Vibration rating per IEC 60068-2-6

<sup>7</sup> Chemical Corrosion rating per ISA 71.04

<sup>8</sup> Surge rating per IEC 61000-4-5

<sup>9</sup> EMI Susceptibility rating per IEC 61000-4-3

<sup>10</sup> ESD (Air) rating per IEC 61000-4-2



## Appendix B Determining Safety Integrity Level

The information in this appendix is intended to provide the method of determining the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF). **The numbers used in the examples are not for the product described in this report.**

Three things must be checked when verifying that a given Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) design meets a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) [N4] and [N7].

These are:

- A. Systematic Capability or Prior Use Justification for each device meets the SIL level of the SIF;
- B. Architecture Constraints (minimum redundancy requirements) are met; and
- C. a  $PFD_{avg}$  calculation result is within the range of numbers given for the SIL level.

A. Systematic Capability (SC) is defined in IEC61508:2010. The SC rating is a measure of design quality based upon the methods and techniques used to design and development a product. All devices in a SIF must have a SC rating equal or greater than the SIL level of the SIF. For example, a SIF is designed to meet SIL 3 with three pressure transmitters in a 2oo3 voting scheme. The transmitters have an SC2 rating. The design does not meet SIL 3. Alternatively, IEC 61511 allows the end user to perform a "Prior Use" justification. The end user evaluates the equipment to a given SIL level, documents the evaluation and takes responsibility for the justification.

B. Architecture constraints require certain minimum levels of redundancy. Different tables show different levels of redundancy for each SIL level. A table is chosen and redundancy is incorporated into the design [N8].

C. Probability of Failure on Demand ( $PFD_{avg}$ ) calculation uses several parameters, many of which are determined by the particular application and the operational policies of each site. Some parameters are product specific and the responsibility of the manufacturer. Those manufacturer specific parameters are given in this third-party report.

A Probability of Failure on Demand ( $PFD_{avg}$ ) calculation must be done based on a number of variables including:

1. Failure rates of each product in the design including failure modes and any diagnostic coverage from automatic diagnostics (an attribute of the product given by this FMEDA report);
2. Redundancy of devices including common cause failures (an attribute of the SIF design);
3. Proof Test Intervals (assignable by end user practices);
4. Mean Time to Restore (an attribute of end user practices);
5. Proof Test Effectiveness; (an attribute of the proof test method used by the end user with an example given by this report);
6. Mission Time (an attribute of end user practices);
7. Proof Testing with process online or shutdown (an attribute of end user practices);
8. Proof Test Duration (an attribute of end user practices); and
9. Operational/Maintenance Capability (an attribute of end user practices).

The product manufacturer is responsible for the first variable. Most manufacturers use the *exida* FMEDA technique which is based on over 350 billion hours of field failure data in the process industries to predict these failure rates as seen in this report. A system designer chooses the second variable. All other variables are the responsibility of the end user site. The exSILentia® SILVer™ software considers all these variables and provides an effective means to calculate  $PFD_{avg}$  for any given set of variables.

Simplified equations often account for only for first three variables. The equations published in IEC 61508-6, Annex B.3.2 [N1] cover only the first four variables. IEC61508-6 is only an informative portion of the standard and as such gives only concepts, examples and guidance based on the idealistic assumptions stated. These assumptions often result in optimistic  $PFD_{avg}$  calculations and have indicated SIL levels higher than reality. Therefore, idealistic equations should not be used for actual SIF design verification.

All the variables listed above are important. As an example, consider a high-level protection SIF. The proposed design has a single SIL 3 certified level transmitter, a SIL 3 certified safety logic solver, and a single remote actuated valve consisting of a certified solenoid valve, certified scotch yoke actuator and a certified ball valve. Note that the numbers chosen are only an example and not the product described in this report.

Using exSILentia with the following variables selected to represent results from simplified equations:

- Mission Time = 5 years
- Proof Test Interval = 1 year for the sensor and final element, 5 years for the logic solver
- Proof Test Coverage = 100% (ideal and unrealistic but commonly assumed)
- Proof Test done with process offline

This results in a  $PFD_{avg}$  of  $6.82E-03$  which meets SIL 2 with a risk reduction factor of 147. The subsystem  $PFD_{avg}$  contributions are Sensor  $PFD_{avg} = 5.55E-04$ , Logic Solver  $PFD_{avg} = 9.55E-06$ , and Final Element  $PFD_{avg} = 6.26E-03$ . See Figure 2.





Figure 2: exSILentia results for idealistic variables.

If the Proof Test Interval for the sensor and final element is increased in one year increments, the results are shown in Figure 3.




**Figure 3 PFD<sub>avg</sub> versus Proof Test Interval.**

If a set of realistic variables for the same SIF are entered into the exSILentia software including:

- Mission Time = 25 years
- Proof Test Interval = 1 year for the sensor and final element, 5 years for the logic solver
- Proof Test Coverage = 90% for the sensor and 70% for the final element
- Proof Test Duration = 2 hours with process online.
- MTTR = 48 hours
- Maintenance Capability = Medium for sensor and final element, Good for logic solver

with all other variables remaining the same, the PFD<sub>avg</sub> for the SIF equals 5.76E-02 which barely meets SIL 1 with a risk reduction factor 17. The subsystem PFD<sub>avg</sub> contributions are Sensor PFD<sub>avg</sub> = 2.77E-03, Logic Solver PFD<sub>avg</sub> = 1.14E-05, and Final Element PFD<sub>avg</sub> = 5.49E-02 (Figure 4).



**Figure 4: exSILentia results with realistic variables**

It is clear that PFD<sub>avg</sub> results can change an entire SIL level or more when all critical variables are not used.





## Appendix C Site Safety Index

Numerous field failure studies have shown that the failure rate for a specific device (same Manufacturer and Model number) will vary from site to site. The Site Safety Index (SSI) was created to account for these failure rates differences as well as other variables. The information in this appendix is intended to provide an overview of the Site Safety Index (SSI) model used by *exida* to compensate for site variables including device failure rates.

### C.1 Site Safety Index Profiles

The SSI is a number from 0 – 4 which is an indication of the level of site activities and practices that contribute to the safety performance of SIF's on the site. Table 10 details the interpretation of each SSI level. Note that the levels mirror the levels of SIL assignment and that SSI 4 implies that all requirements of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 are met at the site and therefore there is no degradation in safety performance due to any end-user activities or practices, i.e., that the product inherent safety performance is achieved.

Several factors have been identified thus far which impact the Site Safety Index (SSI). These include the quality of:

- Commission Test
- Safety Validation Test
- Proof Test Procedures
- Proof Test Documentation
- Failure Diagnostic and Repair Procedures
- Device Useful Life Tracking and Replacement Process
- SIS Modification Procedures
- SIS Decommissioning Procedures
- and others

**Table 10 *exida* Site Safety Index Profiles**

Level	Description
SSI 4	Perfect - Repairs are always correctly performed, Testing is always done correctly and on schedule, equipment is always replaced before end of useful life, equipment is always selected according to the specified environmental limits and process compatible materials. Electrical power supplies are clean of transients and isolated, pneumatic supplies and hydraulic fluids are always kept clean, etc. Note: This level is generally considered not possible but retained in the model for comparison purposes.
SSI 3	Almost perfect - Repairs are correctly performed, Testing is done correctly and on schedule, equipment is normally selected based on the specified environmental limits and a good analysis of the process chemistry and compatible materials. Electrical power supplies are normally clean of transients and isolated, pneumatic supplies and hydraulic fluids are mostly kept clean, etc. Equipment is replaced before end of useful life, etc.
SSI 2	Good - Repairs are usually correctly performed, Testing is done correctly and mostly on schedule, most equipment is replaced before end of useful life, etc.
SSI 1	Medium – Many repairs are correctly performed, Testing is done and mostly on schedule, some equipment is replaced before end of useful life, etc.
SSI 0	None - Repairs are not always done, Testing is not done, equipment is not replaced until failure, etc.



## C.2 Site Safety Index Failure Rates – 8800D

Failure rates of each individual device in the SIF are increased or decreased by a specific multiplier which is determined by the SSI value and the device itself. It is known that final elements are more likely to be negatively impacted by less than ideal end-user practices than are sensors or logic solvers. By increasing or decreasing device failure rates on an individual device basis, it is possible to more accurately account for the effects of site practices on safety performance.

Table 11 lists the failure rates for the 8800D according to IEC 61508 with a Site Safety Index (SSI) of 4 (ideal maintenance practices).

**Table 11 Failure rates with Ideal Maintenance Assumption in FIT (SSI=4)**

Application/Device/Configuration	$\lambda_{SD}$	$\lambda_{SU}$	$\lambda_{DD}$	$\lambda_{DU}$	#	DC
High Trip	0	29	348	107	419	76%
Low Trip	0	68	348	67	419	84%